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ABSTRACT
We present a general Bayesian formalism for the definition of Figures of Merit (FoMs)
quantifying the scientific return of a future experiment. We introduce two new FoMs
for future experiments based on their model selection capabilities, called the decisive-
ness of the experiment and the expected strength of evidence. We illustrate these by
considering dark energy probes, and compare the relative merits of stage II, III and
IV dark energy probes. We find that probes based on supernovae and on weak lensing
perform rather better on model selection tasks than is indicated by their Fisher matrix
FoM as defined by the Dark Energy Task Force. We argue that our ability to optimize
future experiments for dark energy model selection goals is limited by our current un-
certainty over the models and their parameters, which is ignored in the usual Fisher
matrix forecasts. Our approach gives a more realistic assessment of the capabilities of
future probes and can be applied in a variety of situations.
Key words: Cosmology – Bayesian model comparison – Statistical methods
1 INTRODUCTION
As cosmology becomes increasingly dominated by results
emerging from large-scale observational programmes, it is
imperative to be able to justify that resources are be-
ing deployed as effectively as possible. In recent years
it has become standard to quantify the expected out-
come of cosmological surveys to enable comparison, a
procedure exemplified by the Figure of Merit (FoM) in-
troduced by Huterer & Turner (2001) and later used by
the dark energy task force (DETF) for dark energy sur-
veys (Albrecht et al. 2006, 2009). Still in its infancy, how-
ever, is the topic of survey design, where an exper-
iment is optimized, within design or cost constraints,
to generate the best scientific outcome (Bassett 2005;
Bassett, Parkinson & Nichol 2005; Parkinson et al. 2007,
2010).
Both in quantifying and in optimizing survey capability,
it is important to identify the scientific questions one hopes
to answer. The DETF FoM measures the expected parame-
ter constraints on a two-parameter dark energy model, using
a Fisher matrix approach; this is an example of a parameter
estimation FoM, in which the correct cosmological model is
assumed to be known and the task is to estimate its param-
eter values (see also e.g. Mortonson, Huterer & Hu (2010)).
However, many of the most pressing questions in cosmology
concern not parameters but models, i.e. the identification of
the correct set of parameters to describe our Universe. Ex-
amples are whether cosmic acceleration is due to a cosmolog-
ical constant, quintessence, or modified gravity, and whether
or not the Universe has zero spatial curvature. These are
model selection questions, hence forecasts of the capabilities
of future probes should be assessed by their power to an-
swer such questions, rather than the more limited question
of the error they will be able to achieve assuming a given
model is true (i.e., the usual Fisher Matrix forecast). Al-
ternative FoMs, which quantify the ability of experiments
to answer model selection problems, have been previously
discussed by Mukherjee et al. (2006), Trotta (2007b), and
Trotta et al. (2010).1
In this paper we present a comprehensive formalism for
the construction of survey FoMs, incorporating both model
and parameter uncertainty in light of the present observa-
tional situation. In order to do so, we build on the method-
ology introduced in Trotta et al. (2010). We construct two
new model selection FoMs, the decisiveness and the expected
strength of evidence, which quantify the expected capability
of an experiment to perform model comparison tests. For il-
lustration we focus on the case of dark energy observations,
though our formalism is broadly applicable.
1 For an alternative, essentially frequentist, perspective on this
issue, see Amara & Kitching (2010).
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2 BAYESIAN FRAMEWORK FOR
PERFORMANCE FORECASTING
2.1 The expected utility of an experiment
In order to build up towards the definition of our FoMs, we
need to consider the different levels of uncertainty that are
relevant when predicting the probability of a certain model
selection outcome from a future probe. Those can be sum-
marized as follows:
• Level 1: current uncertainty about the correct model
(e.g., is it a cosmological constant or a dark energy model?).
• Level 2: present-day uncertainty in the value of the cos-
mological parameters for a given model (e.g., present error
on the dark energy equation of state parameters assuming
an evolving dark energy model).
• Level 3: realization noise, which will be present in fu-
ture data even when assuming a model and a fiducial choice
for its parameters.
The commonly-used Fisher matrix forecast (see,
e.g. Tegmark, Taylor & Heavens (1996)) ignores the
uncertainty arising from Levels 1 and 2, as it assumes
a fiducial model (Level 1) and fiducial parameter values
(Level 2). It averages over realization noise (Level 3) in the
limit of an infinite number of realizations. Furthermore, in
the Fisher matrix formalism the likelihood is approximated
by construction as a Gaussian, which might be inaccurate
for parameter spaces exhibiting curving degeneracies
and/or multimodal distributions. Clearly, the Fisher matrix
procedure provides a very limited assessment of what we
can expect for the scientific return of a future probe, as it
ignores the uncertainty associated with the choice of model
and parameter values.
The Bayesian framework allows improvement on the
usual Fisher matrix error forecast thanks to a general proce-
dure which fully accounts for all three levels of uncertainty
given above. This will allow us to define a new type of FoM
which represents in a more realistic way the uncertainties
involved in making predictions.
Following Loredo (2003), we think of future data Df as
outcomes, which arise as consequence of our choice of ex-
perimental parameters e (actions). For each action and each
outcome, we define a utility function U(Df , e). Formally, the
utility only depends on the future data realization Df . How-
ever, as will become clear below, the data Df are realized
from a fiducial model and model parameter values. There-
fore, the utility function implicitly depends on the assumed
model and parameters from which the data Df are gener-
ated. The best action is the one that maximizes the expected
utility, i.e. the utility averaged over possible outcomes:
EU(e) ≡
∫
dDfp(Df |e, d)U(Df , e). (1)
Here, p(Df |e, d) is the predictive distribution for the future
data, conditional on the experimental setup (e) and on cur-
rent data (d). For a single fixed model the predictive distri-
bution is given by
p(Df |e, d) =
∫
dθ p(Df , θ|e, d)
=
∫
dθ p(Df |θ, e, d)p(θ|e, d)
=
∫
dθ p(Df |θ, e)p(θ|d),
(2)
where the last line follows because p(Df |θ, e, d) = p(Df |θ, e)
(conditioning on current data is irrelevant once the parame-
ters are given) and p(θ|e, d) = p(θ|d) (conditioning on future
experimental parameters is irrelevant for the present-day
posterior). So we can predict the probability distribution
for future data Df by averaging the likelihood function for
the future measurement (Level 3 uncertainty) over the cur-
rent posterior on the parameters (Level 2 uncertainty). The
expected utility then becomes
EU(e) =
∫
dθp(θ|d)
∫
dDfp(Df |θ, e)U(Df , e). (3)
So far, we have tacitly assumed that only one model
was being considered for the data. In practice, there will be
several models that one is interested in testing (Level 1 un-
certainty), and typically there is uncertainty over which one
is best. This is in fact one of the main motivations for design-
ing a new dark energy probe. If N models {M1, . . . ,MN}
are being considered, each one with parameter vector θi
(i = 1, . . . , N), the current posterior can be further extended
in terms of model averaging (Level 1), weighting each model
by its current model posterior probability, p(Mi|d), given
by
p(Mi|d) =
p(d|Mi)p(Mi)
p(d)
, (4)
where p(d|Mi) is the Bayesian evidence for model Mi,
p(Mi) is the model’s prior and p(d) a normalizing constant.
Using Eq. (3), this gives the model-averaged expected utility
EU(e) =
N∑
i=1
p(Mi|d)
∫
dθip(θi|d,Mi)
×
∫
dDfp(Df |θi, e,Mi)U(Df , e,Mi).
(5)
This expected utility is the most general definition of a FoM
for a future experiment characterized by experimental pa-
rameters e. As we show below, the usual Fisher matrix fore-
cast is recovered as a special case of Eq. (5), as are other
FoMs that have been defined in the literature, e.g. Bassett
(2005); Wang (2008); Amara & Kitching (2010). Therefore
Eq. (5) gives us a formalism to define in all generality the
scientific return of a future experiment. This result clearly
accounts for all three levels of uncertainty in making our pre-
dictions: the utility function U(Df , e,Mi) (to be specified
below) depends on the future data realization, Df , (Level
3), which in turn is a function of the fiducial parameters
value, θi, (Level 2), and is averaged over present-day model
probabilities (Level 1).
2.2 Figures of Merit from expected utility
The expected utility of Eq. (5) provides the most general
formalism for the evaluation of the scientific return of an
c© 0000 RAS, MNRAS 000, 000–000
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experiment. It reduces to previously used FoMs for spe-
cific choices of priors and utility functions. For example,
the DETF advocated using the inverse of the area of the
future probe covariance matrix on the dark energy param-
eters as a FoM quantifying the strength of the statistical
constraints from the experiment. This FoM can be recov-
ered by setting N = 1 in Eq. (5) (only one fiducial model
is considered), taking a Dirac delta function for the current
posterior, p(θ|d,M) = δ(θ − θ⋆) (only the fiducial param-
eter vector θ⋆ is considered), assuming no realization noise
(or equivalently, averaging over many future data realiza-
tions, so that p(Df |θ, e,M) = δ(Df −D(θ⋆)), where D(θ⋆)
describes a no-noise data realization around the fiducial pa-
rameter values, and defining the utility function as the deter-
minant of the future Fisher matrix, evaluated at the fiducial
parameter values, θ⋆.
Another example is the Gaussian linear model consid-
ered by Trotta et al. (2010), where the utility function was
chosen to be the inverse of the marginal error on the pa-
rameters of interest. It is a property of the Gaussian linear
model that the error ellipse does not depend on the fiducial
model nor data realization, but only on the design matrix
(Kunz, Trotta & Parkinson 2006). Therefore, in this case
the integration over future data Df gives unity in Eq. (5),
and the same expression is recovered as in Trotta et al.
(2010).
Mukherjee et al. (2006) defined two model selection
FoMs, each of which considers two models, a cosmological
constant model and a two-parameter dark energy model.
One FoM asks for the strength with which the dark energy
model will be excluded if the cosmological constant is cor-
rect; the current posterior is therefore taken to be that model
and the FoM is the Bayes factor (defined below) in favour of
the cosmological constant. The other FoM is the opposite,
quantifying whether the cosmological constant can be ruled
out if the dark energy model is correct. The current posterior
is now the dark energy model space, and the FoM measures
in how much of that space the cosmological constant model
could be excluded (for example, the inverse parameter area
above a certain Bayes factor threshold, by analogy to the
DETF FoM above).
Trotta (2007b) introduced a methodology to compute
the predicted posterior odds distribution (PPOD) for a
model comparison from a future experiment. A PPOD-based
Figure of Merit is another special case of our general formal-
ism: it is obtained from Eq. (5) by assuming no realization
noise, p(Df |θ, e,M) = δ(Df −D(θ⋆)), and adopting as util-
ity function the tail probability of the Bayes factor obtain-
able by a future probe.
For a given experimental configuration e, the expected
utility can be evaluated as follows:
(i) Draw a uniformly-weighted sample for the fiducial
value for the parameters, θ⋆, from a Monte Carlo Markov
chain distributed according to the present, model-averaged,
posterior p(θ|d) =
∑
i
p(Mi|d)p(θi|Mi, d) (Levels 1 and 2).
(ii) Generate pseudo-data Df for the future probe, as-
suming θ⋆ as fiducial parameter values.
(iii) Evaluate the utility function from the future data (to
be defined below).
(iv) Loop back to (i) and average the utility function over
the so-obtained samples.
In general, the above procedure is computationally very
expensive, as it involves two nested averages, one over the
fiducial parameters (step (i)) and one over future pseudo-
data realizations (step (ii)). Furthermore, in the context of
model selection oriented FoMs to be introduced below, the
evaluation of the utility (step (iii)) requires the computation
of Bayes factors from the pseudo-data, which again is costly.
If one wanted to use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
techniques, one would typically need ∼ 104 samples in step
(i), and another ∼ 105 samples to obtain a reliable estimate
of the utility function in steps (ii) and (iii). Therefore, the
typical number of likelihood evaluations required would be
of order ∼ 109, which is at the limit of what can be achieved
today unless one adopts highly accelerated inference meth-
ods (Fendt & Wandelt 2006; Auld, Bridges & Hobson 2008;
Frommert et al. 2010; Bridges et al. 2010). Therefore, we
shall make some simplifying assumptions that reduce this
computational burden very considerably.
Firstly, we will consider only N = 2 competing mod-
els. Secondly, we will work in the Gaussian likelihood ap-
proximation, i.e., we will assume that both the present-day
and the future likelihood are well approximated by Gaus-
sian distributions. This is the same kind of approximation
involved in the usual Fisher matrix forecast. The assumption
of Gaussianity further allows us to side-step the pseudo-data
generation step: for a given value of the fiducial parameters,
θ⋆, the maximum likelihood estimate θˆf from future dataDf
generated from θ⋆ is distributed as a Gaussian with mean θ⋆
and covariance matrix given by the inverse of the likelihood
Fisher matrix for the future probe. As a consequence, we do
not need to generate pseudo-data at all in step (ii), and we
can instead work directly in parameter space, by drawing θˆf
directly from a Gaussian distribution centered on θ⋆.
Having made the above simplifications, we now turn to
using the expected utility to define two new FoMs based on
model selection.
3 FIGURES OF MERIT FOR MODEL
SELECTION
To assess the science return of proposed missions in terms
of their model selection capabilities, we propose to adopt
the expected utility of Eq. (5) as a FoM for experiment e,
after defining an appropriate utility function U(Df , e,Mi).
There are many ways to do this, and we introduce here two
proposals. The first one is named decisiveness, and it gives
the probability that the proposed experiment will achieve a
decisive outcome for model selection. A good experiment
should be as decisive as possible. A complementary ap-
proach, named expected strength of evidence, is to compute
by how much the experiment is expected to prefer one or
other model on average. Again, a good experiment will be
able to prefer one of the models strongly.
In a two-way Bayesian model comparison, the key
Bayesian statistic is the Bayes factor B01, which is formed
from the ratio of the Bayesian evidences of the two models
being considered:
B01 =
p(d|M0)
p(d|M1)
, (6)
where the Bayesian evidence is the average of the likelihood
c© 0000 RAS, MNRAS 000, 000–000
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Table 1. Empirical scale for evaluating the strength of evidence
when comparing two models,M0 versusM1 (Jeffreys’ scale). The
rightmost column gives our convention for denoting the different
levels of evidence above these thresholds.
| lnB01| Odds Strength of evidence
< 1.0 <∼ 3 : 1 Inconclusive
1.0 ∼ 3 : 1 Weak evidence
2.5 ∼ 12 : 1 Moderate evidence
5.0 ∼ 150 : 1 Strong evidence
under the prior in each model:
p(d|Mi) =
∫
dθip(d|θi,Mi)p(θi|Mi). (7)
The Bayes factor updates the prior probability ratio of the
models to the posterior one, indicating the extent to which
the data have modified one’s original view on the relative
probabilities of the two models. The Bayes factor can be
evaluated by a general numerical method such as nested
sampling (Skilling 2004; Bassett, Corasaniti & Kunz
2004; Parkinson, Mukherjee & Liddle 2006;
Feroz, Hobson & Bridges 2009), or, if one model is
nested within the other, by the Savage–Dickey density ratio
(SDDR) (Trotta 2007a, 2008). The Bayes factor is usually
interpreted on the Jeffreys’ scale shown in Table 1 (Jeffreys
1961; Gordon & Trotta 2007).
3.1 The ‘decisiveness’ Figure of Merit
A ‘decisive’ experiment is one that is able to gather strong
evidence in favour of one of the competing models. There-
fore, its utility function is 0 (1) if the Bayes factor it will ob-
tain is below (above) the ‘strong’ threshold for the evidence,
lnB = 5, see Table 1 (this level of evidence is sometimes
called ‘decisive’, hence the name of the FoM). Therefore, we
are led to the following utility function
U(Df , e,Mi) =
{
1 if | lnB01| > 5
0 otherwise,
(8)
where B01 is the Bayes factor between the two models, ob-
tained by the future experiment e. The best experiment is
the one that maximizes this quantity, i.e. the one whose
probability of obtaining a strong model selection outcome for
either of the models is maximized. We thus define the deci-
siveness D of an experiment e as its expected utility, Eq. (5),
with the utility function (8). We note that D as a Figure of
Merit is especially resilient to the scatter in the Bayes factor
coming from averaging over data realizations and the un-
known fiducial parameter values (Jenkins & Peacock 2011).
In fact, our formalism takes this scatter into full account,
and if too many realizations are scattered out of the ‘de-
cisive’ region (e.g. due to large noise on the measurements
from the future probe) then this will lead to a lower Fig-
ure of Merit. Therefore, using D to optimize the design of
an experiment is particularly useful to guard against this
effect.
3.2 The ‘expected strength of evidence’ Figure of
Merit
Instead of the discrete utility function above, we can adopt
one that is more gradual in assessing the merit of the future
probe. Such a utility function is
U(Df , e,Mi) = (−1)
i lnB01, (9)
which describes the strength of the model selection result
from the future probe. By plugging this utility function into
Eq. (5), we obtain a FoM that we call the ‘expected strength
of evidence’ and denote by E . The rationale is that for every
given fiducial value of the parameters and for every data
realization, the best experiment is the one that maximizes
the support to the true model (i.e., the model out of which
the data actually come from), even though it might be that
the experiment in question is not strong enough to achieve
decisiveness.
The factor (−1)i in Eq. (9) is to ensure that the util-
ity only rewards support for the correct model; e.g. un-
der the more complex model (M1), we want to maximize
− lnB01, the odds in favour of M1. Bayes factors can oc-
casionally favour the wrong model, e.g. if the true model
were a dark energy model with w = −0.999, anything other
than an extraordinarily precise experiment is likely to favour
the more predictive cosmological constant model. Never-
theless, support for the wrong model will happen only in
a small parameter space region and will be overwhelmed
when the average over the current posterior is carried out,
making the above nearly equivalent to the simpler choice
U(Df , e,Mi) = | lnB01|. We have found in the dark energy
application presented below that for all future dark energy
probes the difference in the FoM between these two choices
is less than about 5%, so in practice almost negligible.
It might seem at first glance that an experiment that
maximizes the expected strength of evidence is also one that
minimizes the error ellipse in the parameter space of inter-
est. If this was true, than the ranking of probes obtained
with the expected strength of evidence would be the same as
the one from the DETF FoM. However, consider the SDDR
expression for nested models (Trotta 2007a):
B01 =
p(φ|Df , e, d,M1)
p(φ|M1)
|φ=φ0 , (10)
where φ are the extra parameters of interest for the more
complicated model, which reduces to the simpler model for
φ = φ0. The odds against M0 are maximized when the
marginal posterior on the extra parameters is as small as
possible at the location in parameter space predicted by
the simpler model. This means that maximizing − lnB01
requires minimizing the posterior error along the direction
connecting the fiducial value of (w0, wa) to (−1, 0) (if we re-
strict our consideration to the dark energy example, where
φ = (w0, wa)). In other words, the expected strength of ev-
idence FoM favours experiments that deliver error ellipses
whose most tightly constrained principal direction points to-
wards the location of the simpler model in parameter space,
hence minimizing model confusion. If instead the data come
from M0, then the utility function requires that the height
of the posterior at the location of the true model be as large
as possible. Since the posterior is normalized, this requires
the posterior to be as tightly constrained around the true
value as possible, which is obviously desirable.
To summarize, the decisiveness FoM 0 ≤ D ≤ 1 can be
understood as an absolute scale measuring the model selec-
tion capabilities of an experiment, with D = 1 denoting the
maximum possible performance in terms of model compari-
c© 0000 RAS, MNRAS 000, 000–000
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son utility (i.e., an experiment that is guaranteed to achieve
a decisive model selection result). On the other hand, many
probes might still be interesting to build but may fall short of
the achieving strong evidence anywhere in parameter space,
hence such experiments would all have D = 0. Yet it is still
a relevant question to try and rank them according to their
merits. This can be done by looking at the expected strength
of evidence, which always returns a non-zero value. There-
fore, the expected strength of evidence E can be regarded
as a relative scale of the capabilities of the probes.
4 APPLICATION TO FUTURE DARK
ENERGY PROBES
We now apply our newly defined model selection FoMs to a
set of representative proposals for future dark energy probes.
We consider a ΛCDM model with dark energy in the form
of a cosmological constant versus an evolving dark energy
model where the equation of state is w(z) = w0+waz/(1+z),
described by the two parameters (w0, wa). This is a case of
nested models, i.e., where the simpler model (the cosmolog-
ical constant) is obtained as a special case of the evolving
dark energy model by setting w0 = −1, wa = 0. The other
cosmological parameters (common to both models) are the
baryonic density, the dark matter density, the spatial cur-
vature, the amplitude of scalar adiabatic fluctuations and
the spectral index of perturbations. We include curvature
in our analysis as this impacts strongly on the constraints
on evolving dark energy models (Wang & Mukherjee 2007;
Clarkson, Cortes & Bassett 2007).
The current posterior is obtained using the fol-
lowing data sets: WMAP5 (Dunkley et al. 2009),
Acbar07 (Kuo et al. 2007), CBI (Sievers et al. 2007),
BOOMERANG03 (Jones et al. 2006) for the CMB, SDSS
LRG DR4 (Tegmark et al. 2006) for P (k), the Hubble Key
Project determination of H0 (Freedman et al. 2001), big
bang nucleosynthesis limits on Ωbh
2 (Kirkman et al. 2003),
and the Union supernova-Ia compilation (Kowalski et al.
2008). The priors on the common parameters are irrelevant
as they cancel from the Bayes factor between the two
models (as long as those priors are sufficiently wide to
include the maximum likelihood and uncorrelated with
the dark energy priors, see Trotta (2007a)), so the only
important prior is the one on (w0, wa). We choose a
Gaussian prior centered on w0 = −1, wa = 0 with Fisher
matrix Π = diag(1, 1/2). With this prior and the above
data sets, we obtain a Bayes factor B01 = 13.7 in favour of
the ΛCDM model (representing moderate evidence against
an evolving dark energy). This means that 93% of samples
from the current posterior will be drawn from a ΛCDM
model, and 7% from a model with evolving dark energy.
4.1 Future dark energy probes
We use a selection of future missions based on the DETF
classification (Albrecht et al. 2006), using Fisher matrices
provided by the DETFast package (Dick & Knox 2006).
This package provides only the Fisher matrices evaluated
at a fixed fiducial ΛCDM cosmology, so we have to assume
that the Fisher matrices do not vary significantly for dif-
ferent fiducial parameters drawn from the current posterior.
In other words, we take the Fisher matrix for the future
experiment at a fiducial ΛCDM point and translate it in
parameter space, without recomputing it for each new sam-
ple of θ⋆. This is clearly an oversimplification, but since the
dark energy parameters are the most important ones for
this application, and since 93% of points drawn from the
current posterior belong to the ΛCDM case, we expect that
the results are not too strongly biased. We intend to study
the impact of this assumption and to provide a more com-
prehensive study of the power of future dark energy probes
in future work, while using the simplified approach as an
illustration of our new FoMs here.
The Dark Energy Task Force has classified the dark en-
ergy probes in stages, with stage II being those that are cur-
rently ongoing or completed, stage III being medium-term
projects and stage IV future large projects (optical large
survey telescopes, ‘LST’, space-based missions, ‘S’, and the
square kilometer array, ‘SKA’). The probes that we consider
here include weak lensing (WL), type-Ia supernovae (SN),
Baryon Acoustic Oscillations (BAO), cluster counts (CL)
and combinations of several probes (ALL). A suffix ‘-o’ and
‘-p’ denotes optimistic and pessimistic assumptions about
systematic errors. The ‘p’ in the names of the stage III ex-
periments signals the use of photometric redshifts while an
‘s’ is used for spectroscopic surveys (that tend to cover a
much smaller area). For further, detailed information please
consult the DETF report.
The utility function computation proceeds as follows.
In order to evaluate the decisiveness, Eq. (8), and expected
strength of evidence, Eq. (9), we need the Bayes factor lnB01
for the future experiment. This is obtained analytically via
the SDDR formula, Eq. (10):
lnB01 =
1
2
ln
|Π|
|Fφ|
−
1
2
(φ¯− φ0)
tFφ(φ¯− φ0) (11)
where φ = (w0, wa) are the dark energy parameters of in-
terest, Π is their prior Fisher matrix and Fφ is the marginal
posterior Fisher matrix for φ. We have defined φ0 = (−1, 0)
and φ¯ is the posterior mean from both current and future
data. This can be obtained as the φ-components of the pos-
terior mean vector in the full parameter space,
θ¯ = F−1(Lf θˆf + Lθˆ +Πθ0). (12)
In the above, Lf is the future probe likelihood Fisher matrix,
L is the current constraints Fisher matrix, θ0 is the prior
mean, θˆf is the future maximum likelihood location while θˆ
is the present constraints’ maximum likelihood point. The
Fisher matrix from the future and present data, F , is given
by
F = Lf + L+Π. (13)
The prior used in Eq. (11) is the same as the one
adopted for the analysis of the present-day data. This is
because the prior in the context of Bayesian model selection
should be understood as representing the a priori plausi-
ble parameter values under the model. Therefore, we do not
update the prior to the posterior from the present-day infer-
ence step when evaluating the future Bayes factor. The like-
lihood is obtained from the Fisher matrix formalism, with
the above-mentioned additional assumption that the future
likelihood Fisher matrix is independent of the fiducial pa-
rameter value adopted.
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Figure 1. Comparison of our model selection FoMs to the DETF FoM (left panels) and the ranking of dark energy probes derived from
them (right panels).
Some of the dark energy probes can achieve a very
strong model selection in favour of an evolving dark en-
ergy model in parts of the parameter space, often obtain-
ing lnB01 ≪ −100. This would correspond to a detection of
a non-constant equation of state at many sigma confidence
level. However, we do not expect our Gaussian approxima-
tion to the likelihood to hold true so far into the tails of the
distribution. Therefore, in order to be conservative, we im-
pose a floor at lnB01 = −20 when computing the expected
strength of evidence from Eq. (9): any value of lnB01 below
this floor is remapped to the floor value.
4.2 Results
The results for the future probes are presented in Table 2
and plotted in Fig. 1, where we compare the DETF FoM
with our new model selection FoMs. We notice that the deci-
siveness FoM separates the sample into two distinct groups,
those with D . 0.1 (single probes up to level III and several
c© 0000 RAS, MNRAS 000, 000–000
Designing Decisive Detections 7
Table 2. Results for FoMs of various dark energy probes. D is
the decisiveness given in Eq. (8) and E is the expected strength
of evidence, Eq. (9).
Experiment DETF FoM D E
CL-II 0.13 0 2.3
SN-II 1.4× 10−2 2.0× 10−3 2.7
WL-II 0.7 4.3× 10−3 2.8
BAO-IIIp-p 7.1× 10−5 2.0× 10−4 2.5
BAO-IIIs-p 0.87 1.2× 10−3 2.7
BAO-IIIs-o 1.0 1.5× 10−3 2.7
CL-IIIp-p 0.56 2.9× 10−3 2.7
CL-IIIp-o 8.5 1.5× 10−2 3.4
SN-IIIp-p 4.9× 10−3 1.5× 10−3 2.7
SN-IIIp-o 2.0× 10−3 8.5× 10−3 3.1
SN-IIIs 4.2× 10−2 5.9× 10−3 2.9
WL-IIIp-p 6.4 9.9× 10−3 3.2
WL-IIIp-o 17 1.6× 10−2 3.5
ALL-IIIp-p 59 2.7× 10−2 4.1
ALL-IIIp-o 150 0.53 5.1
ALL-IIIs-p 130 0.38 4.8
ALL-IIIs-o 200 0.58 5.3
BAO-IVLST-p 1.8× 10−2 1.2× 10−3 2.6
BAO-IVLST-o 4.0× 10−2 1.6× 10−3 2.7
BAO-IVSKA-p 1.3 4.3× 10−3 3.0
BAO-IVSKA-o 3.4 9.0× 10−3 3.3
BAO-IVS-p 1.4 3.7× 10−3 3.0
BAO-IVS-o 3.4 7.0× 10−3 3.2
CL-IVS-p 0.50 3.1× 10−3 2.8
CL-IVS-o 9.5 1.6× 10−2 3.5
SN-IVLST-o 0.32 1.4× 10−2 3.4
SN-IVS-p 0.65 9.9× 10−3 3.2
SN-IVS-o 0.76 1.6× 10−2 3.5
WL-IVLST-p 15 1.3× 10−2 3.5
WL-IVLST-o 170 0.77 6.0
WL-IVSKA-p 4.6 1.9× 10−2 3.6
WL-IVSKA-o 280 0.81 6.3
WL-IVS-p 83 0.37 4.7
WL-IVS-o 140 0.67 5.5
ALL-LST-p 180 0.54 5.1
ALL-LST-o 900 0.89 6.9
ALL-SKA-p 160 0.49 5.0
ALL-SKA-o 950 0.90 7.0
ALL-IVS-p 480 0.81 6.2
ALL-IVS-o 900 0.90 6.9
pessimistic single probes at level IV, together with BAO-
IVS-o) that are unlikely to provide a decisive answer to the
question whether dark energy is dynamical or not, and the
rest with D >∼ 0.1. This division is not apparent in E and
the DETF FoM, and it leads to critical values of E ≈ 4 and
DETF FoM ≈ 70 below which an experiment is unlikely to
obtain a strong model selection result.
The ranking of the experiments between D and E is al-
most the same, while the DETF FoM gives a similar but not
always identical ranking. Looking at the right-hand panels
in Fig. 1, we notice that the WL and SN probes tend to
lie above the trend line (are more likely to provide a deci-
sive model selection result than would be expected from the
DETF FoM) while spectroscopic BAO probes lie below.
In Figure 2 we show the distribution of ln(B01) for
106 outcomes for the ALL-SKA-o probe (the most power-
ful probe considered here). The red bars on the right hand
side are for data drawn from a ΛCDM model, for which this
probe often but not always achieves a decisive outcome. The
−20 −15 −10 −5 0 5 100
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Figure 2. Histogram of ln(B01) values for the ALL-SKA-o DETF
case. Red bars (those on the right) show cases drawn from a
ΛCDM model (93% of cases according to current posterior) and
the blue bar those with an evolving dark energy fiducial model
(7% of cases, capped at ln(B01) = −20 as described in the text).
blue bar on the left shows that the probe will deliver very
powerful results if the dark energy is actually evolving (given
the priors adopted, and current knowledge on dark energy
parameters). It is not surprising that the model selection
outcomes against ΛCDM tend be stronger than those that
support it: it is always more difficult to strongly support a
nested model, as the simpler model only “profits” from its
predictiveness (thanks to the Occam’s razor effect), but can
never provide a better fit.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a general Bayesian formalism for the def-
inition of FoMs encapsulating the expected scientific return
of a future experiments. Our method fully accounts for all
source of uncertainties involved in the prediction, including
present-day model and parameter uncertainties, and real-
ization noise. It thus improves on the usual Fisher matrix
methods by producing more realistic forecasts for the possi-
ble distribution of future experimental outcomes.
We used this framework to define two Figures of Merit
for probes that measure the dark energy equation of state in
order to test the ΛCDM paradigm: the decisiveness D which
quantifies the probability that a probe will deliver a decisive
result in favour or against the cosmological constant, and
the expected strength of evidence E that returns a measure
of the expected power of a probe for model selection. We
compared these quantities to the widely-used DETF FoM
for a range of probes, and found that the rankings agree
reasonably well, but that weak lensing and supernova probes
have a higher than expected model selection power relative
to their DETF FoM ranking. We also found, for our choice of
prior, that there is a critical DETF FoM of around 70 below
which probes are very unlikely to obtain a strong model
selection result.
An additional advantage of the formalism presented in
c© 0000 RAS, MNRAS 000, 000–000
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this paper, and of any Figures of Merit that use it, is the
possibility to include further observations, for example those
that constrain the growth history or the presence of effective
anisotropic stresses. One just extends the likelihood based
on the predictions of the underlying models, but the proce-
dure is unchanged, and the interpretation of the results is
unchanged as well. There is therefore no need to define new
FoM’s as data analysis goals for future probes evolve.
The methodology presented here is widely applicable
to a variety of forecasting and optimization problems. Our
application to the model selection capabilities of future dark
energy missions is but a first step towards a fully Bayesian
approach to performance forecast.
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